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one to do so. One cannot but be grateful that the work has been done by so careful a scholar; and yet one feels that in spite of the five hundred and ninety-four pages between the covers the history of Mobile is not given with sufficient clearness of outline to leave a definite image. There is too much in the volume that seems to concern Mobile remotely, or not at all.

PIERCE BUTLER.

*The Relations of the United States and Spain: Diplomacy.* By FRENCH ENSOR CHADWICK, Rear Admiral U. S. Navy. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1909. Pp. 610.)

THE author describes this important work as "the outcome of a study of the causes of the war of 1898 between the United States and Spain" or "the story of more than a hundred years of what has been really a racial strife". But the title of the book furnishes us with a more accurate and exact description than the introduction. It is a study in the history of diplomacy—a very adequate and impartial account of the diplomatic relations between the two countries from 1763 to 1898.

It goes without saying that these diplomatic relations throw an immense flood of light upon the causes of the war with Spain, and Admiral Chadwick has dealt with this phase of the subject in a manner which leaves little or nothing to be desired. Unless valuable material lies hidden in the Spanish archives, his work is not likely soon to be superseded or, indeed, to need serious revision.

But diplomatic relations do not tell the whole story of the causes of any war. Consequently, this work should be supplemented by one which will deal in equally generous and impartial fashion with the economic, social, and general political relations between the two peoples or races. Such a study should include, for example, a comparison between the English and Spanish colonial systems, a discussion of American and Spanish political methods and ideals, a treatment of the racial characteristics and psychology of the two nations, etc.

It should also be said that while the author's hypothesis that the hundred years' diplomatic struggle between the United States and Spain was "really a racial strife" may be partly correct, it can hardly be regarded as demonstrated in this volume. The two excellent authorities (Hume and Lea) cited in the introduction and the repeated illustrations of the Oriental workings of the Spanish mind furnished in the body of the work can scarcely be regarded as sufficient proof.

While it is unquestionably true that the lack of mutual sympathy and understanding contributed in no slight degree to the outcome, it would seem almost self-evident that economic considerations played an important if not a superior (and at times an exclusive) rôle, at least on the part of the United States. This was certainly true in the case of the struggle for the right to navigate the Mississippi, and the author himself points out (p. 407) that "the greed of American and Spanish protectionists was, in fact, at the bottom of Cuban revolt" (in 1895).

The main criticism of the reviewers of this work appears to have been directed against Admiral Chadwick's conclusion that President McKinley's decision on April 11, 1898, to place the issue of war or peace in the hands of Congress was "the best, judged by our knowledge of to-day, for Spain, for Cuba and the United States" (p. 576). It is justly pointed out in this connection (and our author conceals none of these facts) that at the time this message was sent in Spain had practically yielded to all the American demands which were officially presented to her. She had revoked the order of reconcentration, and had, at the eleventh hour, granted the required armistice to the Cuban insurgents. In short, President McKinley surrendered to the war advocates at the very moment when he had won an apparent victory for peace.

Far be it from us to defend such diplomacy. A technical defense might of course be made on the ground that the Spanish propositions of March 31 included a refusal of our proposal for an armistice, and that our terms were never officially accepted. But such a defense would be worthy of an advocate rather than an historian. But we submit that President McKinley's weak and equivocal conduct by no means invalidates Admiral Chadwick's conclusion. Nor does it reflect upon the American people by whom this phase of the subject was not clearly understood at the time.

Suppose the Spanish proposal for an armistice had been accepted by the insurgents—which is altogether unlikely! Suppose the Cuban Peace Congress had met and agreed upon some scheme of autonomy short of absolute independence! How do we know that Cuba would not be in chains to-day? We have nothing to show that Cuba would be free except the opinion of General Woodford, the instrument of these negotiations, and the peace advocates. All we know about Spanish history and the Spanish character operates against this view. Besides, the Spanish government never committed itself in favor of Cuban independence. The weakness of President McKinley's diplomacy lay not in his failure to yield to the pacifists, but rather in his neglect during the negotiations to insist upon the absolute independence of Cuba as a *sine qua non* of peace.

Having given some special attention to this subject, the reviewer may perhaps be excused for saying that he fully agrees with the author that it was wise to cut this Gordian knot with the sword. What misery and bloodshed might have been avoided if it had been cut by General Grant in 1873, or, perhaps better still, by Secretary Webster in 1850!

Little need be said by way of positive criticism of Admiral Chadwick's admirable book. But one error has been noted—a misprint of March 5 for April 5 on page 572. The author quotes freely but discriminately from the documents and allows them to tell the story as much as possible. This adds to the value, but may detract somewhat from the deserved popularity, of the work.

As evidence of his impartiality, might be cited his repeated insistence

upon the fact that the insurgents were at least as guilty as the Spaniards of the misery and starvation in Cuba, and that the Cubans were far greater criminals in the eyes of international law than the Spaniards whose reconcentration policy the Law of Nations does not in fact unreservedly condemn. He need not have been as cautious in stating the reasons for Senator Sherman's appointment as Secretary of State. All the world knows it was to make way for Mark Hanna—the evil genius of the McKinley administration—in the Senate. Great as are the merits of the *New York Nation* in some respects, it may be doubted whether this excellent weekly is ever a safe guide as an indication of American public sentiment.

If any portions of the work are to be marked for special commendation, the reviewer would select the chapters on the Holy Alliance, the Development of the Monroe Doctrine, and the Ten Years' War (including the case of the *Virginus*). There is an excellent index.

*Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1861.* By CHARLES HENRY AMBLER, Ph.D. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1910. Pp. ix, 366.)

THIS book treats Virginia history from 1776 to 1861 and, though it professes only to review those matters which entered into or bore upon the long sectional quarrel between the eastern and the western parts of the state, taken altogether, it is the best history of the Old Dominion since 1776 we have; for the sectional quarrel there, as in the nation at large, was the dominant issue of every crisis, of almost every legislative session.

There are ten chapters, an excellent bibliography, and twelve valuable maps. The first chapter sets forth the geographical and racial differences which were fundamental factors in the politics of the colony for twenty or thirty years prior to the Revolution. Then follow accounts of the conflict of interest between up-country and low-country in 1776, in the period of 1783–1789, and during the struggle between the Jefferson party and the Federalists. There is an excellent chapter on the Rise of the National Republican Party which must be welcome to students of Virginia history who have not hitherto had the tangled personal politics of the so-called era of good feeling analyzed and cleared up.

The best work of the book is, however, that which treats of the Convention of 1829–1830, to which thirty-eight pages are devoted. Forty pages are given to the account of the quarrels over internal improvements, a belated attempt to settle the slavery problem, and Nullification. The remaining one hundred and twenty pages deal with the Whig period, the reform movement of 1850, education, the churches, and political parties. The bibliography of ten pages is perhaps the best we have for this period of Virginia history and it shows how thoroughly the author has explored his field. Many pamphlets, some manuscripts, and practically all the known newspaper files have been consulted.